|
How Rich Countries Got Rich . . . and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor | 
 enlarge | Author: Erik Reinert
Publisher: PublicAffairs
Category: Book
List Price: $17.95
Buy New: $10.15
You Save: $7.80 (43%)
New (26) Used (4) from $10.15
Rating:  5 reviews
Sales Rank: 45106
Media: Paperback
Pages: 400
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.3
Dimensions (in): 9 x 6.1 x 1.3
ISBN: 1586486683
Dewey Decimal Number: 909
EAN: 9781586486686
ASIN: 1586486683
Publication Date: October 6, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Shipping: Expedited shipping available
Condition: Just arrived from publisher but may have dented corners from shipping
| |
| Also Available In:
|
| Similar Items:
|
| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
In this refreshingly revisionist history, Erik S. Reinert shows how rich countries developed through a combination of government intervention, protectionism, and strategic investment—rather than through free trade. Yet when our leaders lecture poor countries on the right path to riches they do so in almost perfect ignorance of the fact that our economies were founded on protectionism long before they could afford the luxury of free trade. How Rich Countries Got Rich… will challenge economic orthodoxy and open up the debate on why self-regulating markets are not the best answer to our hopes of worldwide prosperity.
|
| Customer Reviews:
 Give a man a fish. . . December 24, 2008
J. D Morrow (Somerville, MA)
There is an ongoing argument in comparative economics, why are some countries rich and others poor. According to generally accepted economic theory, a country is able to make the most money by making products that it is best at making (David Ricardo's "comparative advantage"). Further countries have comparative advantage because of the comparative costs of its key input (Hecksher-Ohlin theory), e.g. if a product uses more labor than capital or land it should be made in countries with lots of labor. If countries all did this (and were open in free trade) then the prices of labor, capital and land should - in the long run - even out (Stolper-Samuelson).
Yet this never seems to happen. Rich countries get richer; poor countries get poorer. In the past there has been friction between the Marxists on one side who blamed it on class that didn't allow labor to use comparative advantage to make money and the Capitalists on the other, who blamed it on lack of free-trade and too much government involvement which limited comparative advantage. Since the end of the Cold War ended, the argument has been between "institutions" (poor institutions ruin comparative advantage) and "culture (certain religions, etc. are designed to not allow comparative advantage).
In "How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor," Erik Reinert takes a different tack. Suppose that the error isn't how you try to use comparative advantage but the entire idea itself. To the lay person comparative advantage does not make much sense - I've seen political science professors give up trying to explain it and say "trust me, it works."
Reinert argues that there are two types of economic activity: those with increasing returns to scale, such as manufacturing, steel production, etc., where bigger is better, and those with diminishing returns, such as agriculture. If a nation's comparative advantage is in an activity that produces diminishing returns (where each additional input gets last profit than the last) that nation should support the creation of increasing returns - otherwise it will eventually stop making money.
Reinert's basic argument is that "textbook economics" is wrong because it basis itself off basic models which are inherently wrong and have never been proven right. In "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations" David Landes argued that it was the "Confucian culture" of Korea that made it more economically viable over Ghana. If Ghana's culture was more supported of Capitalism then it would be wealthy too. Institutionalists would argue that it was the strong framework of Korea's economy - central bank, strong currency, low or consistent corruption - that made it get rich and Ghana had an inherently weak institutional structure.
In this work Reinert argues that we shouldn't look at such explanations of why Ricardo failed. Instead we should take the novel step of looking at the evidence. Every nation that has industrialized into "increasing returns" has done so not because of culture or institutions but because they tried to. Renaissance Venice and early Modern United Provinces became wealthy because they had no agriculture and therefore had to create industry. Henry VII's England and Eighteenth Century America went out of their way to buck the comparative advantage of diminishing returns (both eventually fought bloody Civil Wars over the matter). Reinert argues it wasn't the fact that Japan and Korea were Confucian that made them wealthy, but that they protected infant industries before entering the world markets. And, in the process of industrializing, they created the strong institutions others now tout as the ultimate panacea.
Therefore, to make poor countries rich we should not force cultural change or unsteady banking systems upon them. Nor should we make Instead we should promote their industrialization as development. Otherwise we have "development colonialism" where we are stuck in giving a man a fish rather than teaching him to do so.
While you may not agree with everything Reinert says, you have to accept there is something wrong with our economic system. NAFTA was supposed to equalize labor cost while the differnce between American labor and Mexican has gone from 6:1 to 8:1. Neo-liberals may say that in the long run their theories will work but they ignore Keynes' dictate: "In the long run we're all dead!" This book should be at the top of anyone's reading list who is interested in development of poor countries or questions the morality of free-trade.
Fine attack on 'neoliberalism' October 31, 2008
William Podmore (London United Kingdom)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Erik Reinert, Professor of Technology, Governance and Development Strategies at Tallinn University of Technology in Estonia, has written a most remarkable book. He has shown that the free trade creed - the free movement of capital, deregulation and privatisation - doesn't work. As Keynes wrote, "the worse the situation, the less laissez-faire works."
The American economist Paul Samuelson won a Nobel Prize for `proving' that under free trade prices paid to capital and labour tend to be the same across the world. But in the real world, free trade has led, not to the levelling up of world wages and the end of poverty, but to growing inequality and poverty. Half the world lives on less than $2 a day. In many countries, real wages peaked 30 years ago.
Reinert proves that the mode of production determines social forms, and that the technology and mass production of industry are the key to economic growth, not capital, property rights and the rule of law. Industry also has good economic, social and political effects. As he writes, "Creating and protecting industry is creating and protecting democracy."
But how can countries build industry? They need to protect their infant industries and to subsidise their industries.
Countries need to have an industrial policy that provides work for their educated people. Otherwise Western countries, outsourcing their education costs, will take them away - education for migration.
For example, 82% of Jamaica's doctors practise abroad and 70% of university-educated Guyanans work abroad. Their remittances fund consumption and dependence, not investment and industry.
It is better to have an inefficient industry than no industry at all. Reinert points out that the Soviet countries were better off before the 1990s counter-revolutions which deindustrialised and then depopulated them. In 1991-95 Mongolia pastoralised, cutting 90% of its production; wages fell, but the finance, insurance and real estate sector grew.
The old empires all banned manufacturing industry in their colonies. Now the World Bank and the IMF ban industrial policy. They lie to third world countries -open up to imports of goods and capital, be competitive, make your labour markets flexible and you'll grow. The European Central Bank tells EU members the same story.
Welfare colonialism, with $2.3 trillions in aid since 1950, has failed. The Millennium Development Goals will fail too. Aid is a means of control, not of growth, keeping the third world dependent. Palliative economics, which is supposed to ease poverty's symptoms while ignoring its causes, does neither.
Of course, the true market faithful believe that the economics are right, but then the question arises, why are the poor still poor? If the theory is right, there must be something wrong with the people. So some say that it must be race - Keynes was, shamefully, a vice-president of the English Eugenics Society.
Reinert writes, "a major financial crisis is increasingly likely." But the true market faithful are still in power and are making the workers of the world pay for their failed system. How much longer will we allow this?
flawed but well worth checking out June 20, 2008
balyzu (Princeton, NJ)
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
Erik Reinert's "How Rich Countries Got Rich ... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor" is in many ways similar to Ha-Joon Chang's "Bad Samaritans". It argues that rich countries acquired their wealth by protecting their manufacturing industries in their infancy and allowing them to mature. Poor countries are thus poor because they are not allowed to industrialize using infant industry protection and industrial policy. However, Reinert goes about his argument in a very different way than Chang. While Chang mostly his book into neat chapters dealing with pieces of conventional (neoliberal) wisdom (development comes through free trade, some countries are not developed because their culture is unfit, privatization is good in itself, etc.), Reinert structures everything around the dualism of economics: the "Standard Canon" that currently dominates and the "Other Canon" which is what Reinert advocates.
According to Reinart, the "Standard Canon" ("Ricardian" economics named after David Ricardo) has completely lost touch with reality. On one occasion he quotes Milton Friedman according to whom the more important a theory, the more unrealistic its assumptions will be. The inadequacy of assumptions leads to an inadequate understanding of how capitalism works and subsequently - to bad policy. Above all, Reinert dislikes the "equality" assumption that means that all economic activities are qualitatively the same, e.g. it makes no difference whether to specialize in manufacturing or agriculture.
The "Other Canon" draws ideas from the German Historical School, the old Institutionalists, Schumpeter, Keynes, a host of long dead and forgotten Italian and German economists and others. It focuses on production rather than exchange. Logically, then, its main insight is also about production: different economic activities are qualitatively different. Manufacturing has the potential for what Schumpeter called "historical increasing returns" (technological innovation plus increasing returns to scale) and imperfect competition that allow for higher wages, higher profits and a broader tax base. Agriculture (as well as some manufacturing products in the end of their product cycle), on the other hand, provides little or no room for innovation and results in diminishing returns to scale, perfect competition, low wages and low profits. Countries that engage in these activities stand no chance to develop. Another point that Reinert makes again and again is about synergy between different sectors of the economy: agriculture will be more productive when a manufacturing is present, etc.
Reinert makes many other points besides qualitative differences of economic activities and synergies between different sectors of the economy. This includes many interesting shots at standard economics: Washington institutions assume full employment in their models when in many cases that is just ridiculous (e.g. in countries like Haiti less than half of the population has a normal job); in the world of Ricardo's comparative advantage there is no capital while labor hours are devoid of any skills or other characteristics; Schumpeter, usually thought of as a classical liberal, in fact sarcastically called Ricardo's trade theory "excellent" and said it lacked "nothing but sense". Sometimes these small pieces seem to fit into a larger picture, sometimes they seem all over the place and hard to absorb, or make sense of. That is the main problem of this book: after reading it, it would be hard to summarize it outside of the most basic insights. "Increasing returns" and "synergies" are repeated endlessly, whereas some other ideas are not so well established. It is often said that Schumpeter's classic "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy" suffers from poor editing. Reinert seems to have inherited that same problem from one of his main intellectual influences.
That is not to say that this book is stylistically unappealing. Reinert's digressions to a more personal narrative are fairly effective: they include the story of Mongolia's deindustrialization (including the idiotic prattle of Jeffrey Sachs about how Mongolia should specialize in computer software) which he witnessed first hand, his experience with Irish and Finnish industrial policy, manufacturing industry, and academia.
Moreover, he does not hesitate to attack beliefs coming from anywhere within the political spectrum: besides attacking conservatives like Friedman, he attacks Paul Krugman (cherished by many American liberals) for his "Krugmanian vice": developing a more realistic trade theory that incorporates diminishing and increasing returns (New Trade Theory) and then ignoring it altogether for policy purposes. State-planning and market fundamentalism were both born from Ricardian economics, Reinert argues. The preoccupation with redistribution rather than wealth creation is also criticized. In terms of personal influences he draws from a broad range as well: Polanyi (a social democrat) and Schumpeter (a conservative) both inform the author's arguments.
This book is provoking, interesting, somewhat messy and hard to summarize. If you are interested in economic development as well as heterodox perspectives, check it out.
 Nice History, Bad Logic January 28, 2008
J. Hanley (Michigan)
13 out of 27 found this review helpful
Reniert gets 3 starts for a well-argued case for protectionism by developing countries. He accurately shows that most now-well developed countries used protectionist policies during their developmental periods.
He fails, however, to prove that those countries' protectionist policies were causal factors in the countries' development, and the unavoidable counter-argument that protectionism actually retarded their development has not been disconfirmed.
This may sound silly: after all, the U.S., England, France, etc., are all developed now, so how could their development have been retarded? Well, the fact is, we don't have alternate histories to compare for these countries. Reniert only assumes, he cannot demonstrate, that they could not have developed faster if they had eliminated their protectionist policies.
In short, protectionism may just be a historical fact of now-developed countries. But of course correlation does not equal causation.
Counter-arguments:
England actually developed faster after it eliminated its "corn laws" (restrictions on import of grains).
Government agencies, not having to worry about losing money and going out of business, have little incentive to spur them to make good investment choices, and do not have good a track record of doing so. Reinert doesn't really deal with the fact that all protectionist policies only protect those businesses with the political influence to get government to favor them. That, of course, doesn't automatically equal good economic choicer by government. And he doesn't satisfactorily answer Adam Smith's claim that free markets are for the benefit of consumers, not businesses. If protectionism drives up prices, that harms consumers. And of course they cannot support as many different local/national businesses if to much of their income is directed by the government toward just a handful of companies.
But worth reading to see the free-market skeptics side of the argument. Just don't forget that all these arguments have been answered before, by a variety of economists.
To Become a Rich Country: Industrialization Policy First, Free Trade Second November 12, 2007
Serge J. Van Steenkiste (Atlanta, GA)
37 out of 43 found this review helpful
Erik Reinert masterfully uses experienced-based economics to demonstrate how rich countries got rich. Economic growth and welfare in rich countries originated not in unrestrained international free trade, but in conscious and deliberate industrialization policy that progressively shaped a particular form of economic structure (pp. xx, xxiv, 9-10, 47-48, 65, 79-83, 88, 98-100, 115-20, 177, 198, 246-49, 288-89).
Reinert's greatest merit is to clearly show how economic development really works (pp. 39, 52, 305-08):
1) A country first industrializes behind a wall of tariffs, direct subsidies, and/or patents and is then slowly and systematically integrated economically with nations at the same level of development (pp. 17, 22-24, 56, 84, 88, 134, 171, 210, 235, 268-69, 273). The United States followed the example of England to industrialize behind a protectionist wall for about 150 years based on Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (pp. 23-25, 31, 58, 212). The Marshall Plan to reindustrialize Europe after WWII was built on the same logic (pp. 63, 89-90, 179-81, 241, 265-66).
Countries already wealthy need very different economic policies from those of countries still poor (p. 81). An aspiring poor country needs to tax "bad" trade, i.e., exports of raw materials (read agricultural or mining products) and imports of industrial products (pp. 17, 21, 62, 78). Perfect or commodity competition is for the poor, resulting in price-driven diminishing returns, no industrialization, and immigration to the rich world (pp. 8, 18, 62, 71, 133, 149-201, 245, 280-81). Unlike development economics, palliative economics do not radically change the productive structures of poor countries but instead focus on easing the pains of economic misery (pp. 63, 179, 211, 239-70, 282, 296-97).
Paradoxically, being poor in natural resources is one of the keys to becoming rich (pp. 7, 77). A poor country has to encourage "good" trade, i.e., imports of raw products and exports of industrial products. The existence of an (inefficient) manufacturing sector establishes a national wage level which prevents countries from moving too far into diminishing returns (pp. 109, 124, 183, 251, 265, 295). Reinert observes that "good" trade also results from the export of industrial goods in exchange for other industrial goods (p. 89).
That initial protection is essential to achieve increasing returns and to access new technologies (p. 67). Once these goals are achieved, further protectionism is counterproductive. Reinert contrasts the "good" protectionism of East Asia with the "bad" protectionism of Latin America (pp. 224, 285, 311-12). Solidly industrialized countries require bigger and more international markets to further develop and prosper (p. 81).
The timing of the opening up of an economy to international competition is therefore critical. Opening up too late undermines growth (p. 205). In contrast, opening up prematurely will result in deindustrialization, falling wages, and increasing social problems (p. 252). Mongolia and Peru are two examples that come to mind (pp. 110, 164, 173-79, 251-52). That insight about the timing of free trade is absent in the Washington Consensus as applied to most of the developing world (pp. 19, 55, 68-69, 81, 84, 107, 204, 216-37, 244, 278, 295).
2) The preconditions for wealth, democracy, and political freedom are diversified manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services subject to increasing returns (pp. 268-69). In some economic activities (read manufacturing and advanced services), costs fall as the volume of production increases (pp. 36, 38, 108-09).
David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage in international trade relies on a number of simplistic, abstract assumptions that too often lock poor countries into specializing in being poor (pp. 15, 23, 42, 59, 75, 106, 277, 301-04, 309-10). One of the key assumptions is that there are no qualitative differences between economic activities. If left alone, the market will even out the differences between say, Microsoft in the U.S. and goat-herders in Mongolia (p. 177). Ricardo's theory is also built on the rigid assumption that there can be no change in specialization, which unsurprisingly results in factor-price polarization (pp. 19, 117, 213-14).
3) Economic wealth results from synergies, i.e., people of many different trades and professions sharing a community (pp. 73, 93-95, 102, 136, 268-69, 275). The diversity of economic activities based on the extent of division of labor makes it possible for new knowledge to be transferred from one sector to the other (pp. 94-95, 256-63, 276). Ricardo's theory completely ignores synergies (p. 214).
Reinert clearly explains to his audience that this path for a country to join the club of rich countries is much more difficult today than in the past for the following reasons (pp. 290, 292-93):
1) Information Technology: Unlike process innovations, product innovation tends to create imperfect competition and higher wages. For example, at Google, search technology as a product innovation results in high wages and high profits. When the same technology is employed in say, the hotel and airline industries, the results are falling margins for the travel industry and lower wages for many persons employed in that sector of activity (pp. 188, 229).
2) Intellectual Property: The increasing percentage of copyrighted, trademarked, and patented products widens the gap between rich and poor countries (pp. 111-14). For example, the pharmaceutical industry based in rich countries works hard to legally protect the output of its substantial investment in research and development.
3) Workers Distribution: There is a transition from single-plant economies of scale towards multi-location economies of scope. For example, the integrated American automakers are evolving toward modular architectures for their mainstream models to compete on speed and flexibility.
4) Workforce Mix: Manufacturing increasingly gets automated while services occupy an increasing percentage of the total workforce.
5) Workers Substitution: Service workers are often more easily substituted than specialized industrial workers, resulting in diminished workers' bargaining power.
6) Employers Fragmentation: Decentralized franchising instead of centralized ownership also reduces workers' power at the negotiation table.
To summarize, Reinert recommends that poor countries study the policies of those who created American and European prosperity, and ignore the advice of their forgetful successors (pp. xxix, 13). "Do not do as the Americans tell you to do, do as the Americans did," concludes Reinert (pp. 23, 168).
|
|
|
SEO and Marketing TipsBETA RELEASE | |
